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https://www.colorado.edu/journals/standards/V5N1/marlonintro.html
EXCERPT:
It's no longer enough, if it ever was,
to critique interlocking systems of oppression without offering
affirming alternatives of how society should and can reconstitute
itself. As we move into the inevitably more demanding multilingual,
multicultural environment--both nationally and globally--of the
next century, our greatest task will be an inversion of the commonly
assumed equivalence between difference and disunity. We must
re-write this equation, demonstrating again and again that unity
does not require unanimity, that unity--that is, a sense of social
cohesion, of community--can and does derive from the expression,
comprehension, and active nurturing (and not merely tolerance
or fetishization) of difference.
This is the new standard of civilized life
that now demands our urgent labor, a new world order, if you
will, that subverts traditional conceptions of social order:
a standard which in effect subverts the meaning of the word "standard"
itself. For the new order must be comprised of multiple standards:
shifting, open-ended, dynamically transforming, so as to engender
ways of thinking and living that privilege no one set of cultural
differences over another but affirm virtue in all. http://meme.gruwup.net/%23MassiveMischievousMarvelOfMoldingMuck/
 MMMMM.mp3
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Morality is subjective to absolute morality considerations. Can
their be absolute morality considerations any way? Can their be
absolute truth considerations anyway?
I say YES with the aid and services of my trust building personal information system and technology known as:
@Realuphuman : @Gruwup : @Fuckeduphuman : A Morality Correctiveness recombinant memetics active society presence of information technology
Feb 27, 2013 - Similar to recombinant DNA (in which different genetic sequences are brought together to create something new), recombinant memetics
is the study of how memes (ideas that spread from person to person) can
be adjusted and merged with other memes and memeplexes (a cohesive
collection of memes, ...
7. Recombinant MemeticsThis one's quite speculative, and
it's technically speaking still in the proto-science phase. But it'll
only be a matter of time before scientists get a better handle on the
human noosphere (the collective body of all human information) and how
the proliferation of information within it impacts upon virtually all
aspects of human life. Similar to recombinant DNA (in which
different genetic sequences are brought together to create something
new), recombinant memetics is the study of how memes (ideas that spread
from person to person) can be adjusted and merged with other memes and
memeplexes (a cohesive collection of memes, like a religion) for
beneficial or ‘socially therapeutic' purposes (such as combating the
spread of radical and violent ideologies). This is similar to the idea
of 'memetic engineering' — which philosopher Daniel Dennett suggested
could be used to maintain cultural health. Or what DARPA is currently doing via their ‘narrative control' program. 8. Computational Social ScienceSimilar to cliodynamics, computational social science
is the rigorous investigation of social phenomenon and trends over
time. The use of computers and related information processing
technologies is central to this discipline. Quite obviously, this field
has only really been possible since the advent of computing, and most
especially since the rise of the internet. Computational social
scientists study the copious amounts of information left behind from
emails, mobile phone calls, tweets, credit card purchases, Google
searches, and on and on. It's a field of study that's attracting not
just social scientists, but mathematicians and computer scientists as
well. Examples of their work include studies into the structure of
social networks and how information spreads across them, or how intimate
relationships form on the Web. Image: Nature.
Memetics is the study of information and culture based on an analogy with Darwinian evolution. Proponents describe memetics as an approach to evolutionary models of cultural information transfer. Critics regard memetics as a pseudoscience. Memetics involves sidestepping the traditional concern with the truth of ideas ...
It is also argued a time as short as 1000 years. inthispaper that recombinant memetics
is possible incomplete analogy The books EOC, TSG, GMC, TEP and PF set
the stage for rigorous to recombinant DNA / genetic engineering. Special
attention is paid to understanding of cultural transfer in terms of
tools successfully ...
Memetics can be defined as an approach trying to model the evolution of memes . Memes undergo processes of variation (mutation, recombination)
of their internal structure. Different variants will compete for the
limited memory space available in different individuals. The most fit
variants will win this competition, and spread ... Realmemetik
vs Internet memes. Realmemetic is a made-up word to highlight the point
that a lot of memes exist off- line in the real world. Internet memes,
particularly variations of comical pictures of cats with badly spelt
anottions with the impact font have become the name bearing type for a meme, almost to the exlusion of ...
JOM:EMIT (2001): "...whether the units of memetic transmission and recombination
in the birdsong of a particular species of finch exist at the level of
individual songs or instead at the level of grammar models... [is] not
easily solved using the limited data obtainable in the field." Marr,
A.J. " Dawkin's Bad Idea: Memes, Genes ... May 13, 2015 - Buzz phrase of the week Recombinant Memetics This one's quite speculative, and it's technically speaking still in the proto-science phase. But it'll...
Memetics: Memes and the Science of Cultural Evolution [Tim Tyler] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Memetics
is the name commonly given to the study of memes - a term originally
coined by Richard Dawkins to describe small inherited elements of human
culture. Memes are the cultural equivalent of ...
Apr 19, 2013 - Memetic hitchhiking;; Random and deliberative recombination;; Random and deliberative mutation;; Retromemes;. One of the techniques used in genetic engineering involves recombinant DNA. Memetic engineering similarly features recombinant memes. As with practically any engineering project, ...
And how this field of study applies to yours?
I
am 1000% behind any form of applied or "recombinant" memetic
research--as it is high time we've figured out a way to rewire people's
brains so they stop believing in idiotic bullcrap. ---------------------------
It is my stated intentions that there shall be a replacement of
Jonathan Arellano Jackson 30 days after the close of trial court case [
23rd of February ] in San Bernardino County Criminal Case SBCounty
DA Vs. Driskill in the electronic and phone harassment charges.
That replacement on #Kramobone-The.Good shall be deemed necessary.
That
replacement of #Kramobone-The.Good for State Authority To Enable Rights
For Persons With Disabilities is Absolutely REQUIRED.
It
is my stated intention that the person named as Doctor Sadiq Mirza in
the email addressing of this email shall be the person to inherit this
role and duty towards my mental health wellness and my enable rights
responsibilities.
There are no harassment claims
when there is no physical threat of violence included in the
content. There is no harassment but discrimination when my rights
as persons with disabilities to be a fully and equal participation
member of society has been so violently violated by the HIV/AIDS Social
Services Networks of the Ryan White Care Act of Agencies that I have had
case management contracted services client concerns for over 10
years. In Denver, I have completely use my personal information
system to create the documentation necessary to prove beyond reasonable
doubt now with the latest Glassdoor Employee Reviews Appearing Against
Colorado Health Network aka Denver Colorado Aids Project. PLEASE LISTEN TO THIS REGARDING EVOLVING MORALITY:
34 Minute Audio Presentation On Community Responsibility On
Accountability of Social Services Network in This Case to Be Held To
REPRIMANDS Standards: http://jonathan-arellano-jackson.gruwup.net/Meme/Memes/%23EvolvingMorality/Matt%20Schrage%20-%20%23EvolvingMorality.ogg
doctor-sadiq-mirza.gruwup.net/Meme/Memes/%23EvolvingMorality/Matt%20Schrage%20-%20%23EvolvingMorality.ogg
------ http://blogs.harvard.edu/mattschrage/category/evolving-morality/
~
Archive for Evolving Morality ~
mattschrage - July 10, 2017 @ 9:30 pm
· Filed under Evolving Morality
There are three major approaches that can be used to define a
moral philosophy: virtue ethics, where moral good is derived through
moral character; Kantian deontology where moral good is arrived at
procedurally, through complex duties and rules; and utilitarianism where
the consequences of actions, rather than the intent, determine what is
morally good. Each of these moral philosophies has merits, yet
utilitarianism appears to be the best prepared to operate as a
metamorality, that is a guiding philosophy for a multi-tribal society
Utilitarianism succinctly answers two central questions that confront
any potential metamorality: who deserves moral consideration and what
should the common currency of morality be? Utilitarians believe in
maximizing happiness, impartially. So happiness, or more specifically
the overall quality of experience, is the common moral denominator
across different groups. And everyone deserves moral
consideration, equally. Furthermore, utilitarianism is based around
consequences — the outcomes of, rather than intentions behind, specific
actions are what determine whether the actions themselves are justified.
This is not how most people are accustomed to thinking of morality.
For many people, morality is defined by the values of their in group
or ‘tribe.’ This more traditional approach is the basis for religious
morality and tribal morality more broadly. Virtue ethicists ask what a
‘good’ person would do? The moral philosophy is grounded in the idea of
Aristotelian idealism: that things are good when they conform to their
natural purpose. [1]
The limitations of virtue ethics as a foundation for metamorality are
obvious. The definition of a good person is highly dependent upon tribal
modes of thinking. For Aristotle, it meant looking at role models
within a society and working to emulate those who excelled. Virtue
ethics is a philosophical codification of innate tribal ideals. It
defines “good” in the terms of what is valued by a single group. While a
philosophy of virtue ethics is good for inducing cooperation within a
group, it cannot function effectively as a metamorality.
The third model for a normative metamorality comes from Emmanuel
Kant. Kantian ethics is highly humanistic — and initially appears as
though it would provide a solid foundation for a type of universal
morality. It is predicated on respect for humanity, the innate dignity
of people and individual autonomy. Kant derives these noble principles
through the empiricism of pure reason. For Kant, a good person follows
the “laws they give themself.” And all of these self-derived laws should
follow the categorical imperative. That is be unconditional moral
obligations that is binding in all circumstances; it applies to everyone
so must be universalizable.[2] The core tenet of Kantian deontology is that people should not be used as means
to an end. The deontological theory of ethics that Kant promotes would
run into limitations as a universal metamorality. Kant arrives at his
conclusions through some impressive rhetorical acrobatics. He appears to
rationalize intuitive feelings about morality rather than providing the
foundation for a self-consistent moral system. His theory of
self-derived universal rules and duties lacks the symbolic clarity of
utilitarianism.
That’s not to say that utilitarianism is perfect. There are two categories of criticism that utilitarianism faces: (1) shallow, naive criticisms based on a facile understanding of the philosophy and (2) deep
criticisms that engage with the philosophy and hit upon edge cases that
appear morally questionable. This paper will focus on the later
category. Criticisms that fall into this category tend to be thought
experiments that in which maximizing ‘happiness’ seems to lead to
problematic conclusion. This paper will examine three of these thought
experiments: Ursula Le Guin’s short story, “The Ones Who Walked Away
From Omelas,” Robert Nozick’s “Utility Monster” and the “Repugnant
Conclusions” arrived at by Derek Parfit.
In “The Ones Who Walked Away From Omelas,” noted science fiction
author, Ursula Le Guin, describes the fictional almost-utopia of Omelas.
It is a idyllic city where its citizens happiness is maximized: “With a
clamor of bells that set the swallows soaring, the Festival of Summer
came to the city Omelas, bright-towered by the sea. … Omelas sounds in
my words like a city in a fairy tale, long ago and far away, once upon a
time. Perhaps it would be best if you imagined it as your own fancy
bids, assuming it will rise to the occasion, for certainly I cannot suit
you all.”[3]
However this utopia is, for reasons that are left unclear, predicated
on the suffering of a single, pitiful child who remains locked up,
isolated, in the darkness of a cellar. This child has done nothing to
deserve this treatment; it is not a punishment. And yet if the child
were to be released, the city of Omelas would be crumble within the
hour.
This situation encapsulates what is, in many ways, the fundamental
critique of utilitarianism: the discomfort of seeing an individual used
as a means to an end. There is not justification for the
child’s imprisonment, beyond the supernatural supposition that releasing
the child would result in the disintegration of the utopia. Everything
about this situation feels wrong. Le Guin describes in great
detail the child: “It could be a boy or a girl. It looks about six, but
actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps it was born
defective or perhaps it has become imbecile through fear, malnutrition,
and neglect. It picks its nose and occasionally fumbles vaguely with its
toes or genitals… They all know it is there, all the people of Omelas.”[4]
Le Guin asks the reader to weigh the suffering of a child against
utopia — and she freely puts her finger on the scale. The vivid details
she includes certainly speak to her skill as a writer but perhaps not as
a moral philosopher. The same moral question that her short story
prompts could be stated more dryly: Is it right for the prevention of
single person’s suffering to result in an increase in the suffering of
many others? The framing of Omelas accentuates an emotional response to
utilitarianism. By flattening the narrative of a child’s torture to a
neutral, intellectual question, Le Guin’s critique loses some of its
sting.
It would be fair to respond that child of Omelas might experience a
degree of suffering that outweighs the happiness of all the people. If
this were indeed the case, the city of Omelas would be
committing an immoral action. However, it would be immoral by the tenets
of utilitarianism, in addition to violating Kant’s categorical
imperative.
The second deep criticism is Robert Nozick’s “Utility Monster.” This
monster is a hypothetical creature that gets such gratification from
eating a person that it outweighs all the enjoyment that that person
will experience in their entire lives by many orders of magnitude. He
writes in Anarchy, State & Utopia that “[u]tilitarian
theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get
enormously greater gains in utility from any sacrifice of others than
these others lose.”[5]
According to Nozick, given these conditions, the good utilitarian would
sacrifice herself to this “monster’s maw.” After all, this maximizes
the total level of happiness.
This obligation feels repellant. The individual asks herself, “Why should I
be forced to sacrifice my life in order to satisfy this creature?” But
isn’t it possible that this is the appropriate response? People are so
grounded in the primacy of their own existence that it is easy to
rationalize reasons that they shouldn’t be obligated to end it. Perhaps
she would mention her right to life, or her desire to not be used as a
means to this creatures’ end. This feels wrong because humans have evolved to value their own existence and this monster triggers a primal desire for life.
When deconstructed, the core of Nozick’s thought experiment is the
obligation of a single person sacrificing themselves in order to produce
a good outcome — a better outcome than what would happen if they did
not sacrifice themselves. The utility monster is one example of this
phenomenon, but so is a soldier throwing himself on a grenade to spare
the lives of several of his fellow comrades by shielding them from the
blast. So is a starving mother giving the meager rations that she
receives to her hungry child.
The utility monster triggers outrage because the situation feels
unfair and greedy; in fact the thought experiment is intended to do
this. The hypothetical is designed to mask the true moral question,
which when rephrased sounds decidedly more reasonable.
A third criticism of utilitarianism comes from Derek Parift in the form of the repugnant conclusion that he arrives at in Reasons and Persons.
He believes that the inevitable, immoral corollary of blindly
maximizing happiness is that morality is reduced to a ‘mere addition’
problem. Consider two possible worlds. In the first everyone has a
quality of life similar to what is experienced by those best off in our
world, today. In the second, people experience a quality of life that is
precisely half of what is experienced by those in the first world.
However, in the second world, there are twice as many people as exist in
the first, so the aggregate level of happiness is identical across
both. Now add one more person to the second world. The aggregate level
of happiness is now marginally higher in the second world.
Which world would be better to live in? Most people would
say the former. Yet if impartially maximizing happiness is what truly
matters then, according to Parfit, the second world is morally superior.
This logic seems like it can lead to a bizarre supposition. Does
utilitarianism really advocate for endless slums over a small utopia?
But assuming that each world is unaware of the possible existence of
the other, this conclusion isn’t actually that problematic. For all we
know, our civilization could be the second world in this scenario. It is
easy to imagine a hypothetic alternate world with a dramatically
smaller population, which is significantly happier. That doesn’t condemn
our society to unhappiness — we simply don’t know what we are missing
out on!
Parfit has a response to this. He envisions as world of infinite
mildly content rabbits. His critique is that, according utilitarian
philosophy, this hypothetical world populated solely by rabbits — and
not even the happiest of rabbits, mere somewhat content rabbits
— is morally superior to our contemporary society. This is an extreme
scenario. And again, on an emotional level, it feels like the logic of utilitarianism resulted in a repugnant conclusion.
These critiques, for the most part, rely on hypotheticals — they are
not real world situations and likely never could be. But the innate
reactions people have when faced with these moral dilemmas is
enlightening in it owns way. The common theme that ties these critiques
together is their intention to trigger an emotional response: the
defenseless, innocent child of Omelas being tortured; the greedy monster
that one is obligated to satiate with the sacrifice of their own life;
the mundanity of an infinite sea of rabbits replacing the vibrancy of
human civilization.
Many of the traditional criticisms of utilitarianism are simply
creatively phrased tradeoffs that trigger a negative emotional response.
They feel wrong. Yet when the true moral question of the
thought experiment is extracted from the language of the experiment
itself, the moral disgust evaporates. The answers that utilitarianism
provides are intellectually correct, yet difficult to reconcile with
intuitive moral reactions.
When utilitarianism does run up against these uncomfortable conclusions, there are two responses. The first is accommodation:
that the outcomes, while they do ultimately follow from the basic
principles of utilitarianism, are morally abhorrent. In accommodating
these outcomes, the utilitarian implicitly acknowledges that blindly
following utilitarianism is not always good. Nonetheless, utilitarianism
remains a viable philosophy because these bad outcomes stem from
unrealistic situations that would not occur in the real world.
The second response to criticism of utilitarianism is reform.
Not reform of the moral philosophy itself, instead reform of society’s
traditional conception of morality. This response asserts that though
these outcomes intuitively feel wrong, a true metamorality shouldn’t be
based on biologically derived emotional responses. In other words,
utilitarianism isn’t producing immoral outcomes; rather, humans are just
bad at judging what is moral and what is not.
Utilitarianism is valuable as a metamorality precisely because it
arrives at unintuitive conclusions. It is an intellectual mechanism that
forces people out of the comfort of their traditional moral beliefs —
whether those beliefs are based on Kantian deontology or Aristotelian
virtue. Perhaps discomfort with utilitarian conclusions says less about
the moral system itself and more about the how deeply tribal beliefs are
ingrained in the way people intuitively think.
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/
[3] Le Guin 1-2
[4] ibid 3
[5] Nozick 42
mattschrage - July 10, 2017 @ 9:29 pm
· Filed under Evolving Morality
There are few technologies that have had as significant an impact
on the human condition as the discovery of antibiotics. In a very
fundamental way, antibiotics enabled the modernization of healthcare. In
the twenty years following the discovery of penicillin, dozens of other
antibiotics were uncovered. However, in the last twenty years the
number of new antibiotics can be counted on a single hand. If the rate
of evolved resistance in bacteria stays the same while the rate of
discovery of new antibiotics continues to slow, we will soon find
ourselves in a world were the field of medicine is thrown back to the
barbarism of the 1800s — where any simple surgery is once again life
threatening. Antibiotic resistance is an example of a globalized commons
problem. Unlike localized commons problems which have been discussed
extensively in academic literature, globalized commons problems, ones
that ones that occur in domains that lie outside of the political reach
of any one nation, such as global warming and antibiotic resistance, are
relatively new phenomenon.
In “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessens, Global Challenges,” Elinor
Ostrom examines the nature of common pool resources and suggests
alternative institutions for their management, seeing the evolution of
cooperative norms as a potential solution. Globalized commons problems
are highly difficult to solve — regardless of whether through Ostrom’s
proposed evolved norms or through traditional mechanisms, such as
increased regulation. In this paper, I will argue that antibiotic
resistance is an example of a globalized commons problem and the
inability to deal with it, either through state intervention or through
the evolution of norms, signals biologically derived principles of
cooperation are insufficient and that new supranational organizational
structures are needed in order to prevent such problems from
metastasizing.
Antibiotics usage exhibits the two features Ostrom suggests
characterize commons problems, (1) difficulty of exclusion and (2)
subtractability, meaning the “exploitation by one user reduces resource
availability for others.”[1]
The difficulty of exclusion comes from antibiotics’ ubiquity. They are
relied on in hospitals and for medical care more broadly, but also as a
supplement in the diet of livestock. A ban on antibiotics would be
highly controversial and would have far reaching consequences. Though it
could be done, the institutional challenges would be unprecedented and
push back would be fierce.
The question of subtractability is more interesting. Antibiotics are
not a finite resource in the classic sense. The active ingredients can
be synthesized relatively easily. Some knowledge of how antibiotics work
is required in order to understand why they should be thought of as
subtractable. Antibiotics kill bacteria by targeting specific features,
such as the structure of cell walls or the cellular machinery used to
build proteins or copy DNA, that differ between bacteria (prokaryotic
cells) and the eukaryotic cells that make up multicellular organism like
humans.[2]
However, when exposed to antibiotics over an extended period of time,
with a concentration that doesn’t kill the entire population outright,
bacteria can evolve resistance. The bacteria that have a slight natural
resistance survive and reproduce, while those that lack the adaptation
perish. As a result, anytime an antibiotic is used, its overall
theoretical effectiveness decreases as more exposure equates to more
potential for a mutation that confers resistance to occur. Antibiotics
are a naturally occurring resource that is indirectly made more scarce
though human consumption. Unlike with traditional natural resources, the
usage of antibiotics doesn’t tax some finite supply, however it does
potentially reduce the effectiveness of the drug, globally.
The case of antibiotic resistance demonstrates the limitations of
biologically derived principles of cooperation. Evolved norms tend to be
more effective on smaller scales and when dealing with lower stakes.
At smaller scales, the currency of trust and reputation and the pull of
an in-group can serve to force individuals to act more altruistically
and think on a longer time horizon, rather than optimize for short-term
gains. However, when applied to a more abstract problem like antibiotic
resistance, the principles of cooperation seem to incentive short-term
thinking. Kin selection is a prime example, showing how what is
cooperative on a small scale is actually uncooperative on a larger
scale. Parents want their children to have access to antibiotics because
(from an evolutionary perspective) they want to see their genes passed
on and keeping their child healthy is necessary for that to happen.
Furthermore, the notion of evolved norms implicitly assumes the
failure of models that didn’t effectively deal with the problem. On a
localized scale, this is acceptable. However, when a failure case has
potentially global impacts, even a single error is one too many. To give
somewhat of a contrived example, nobody would suggest that evolved
norms be applied to the safeguards of nuclear weapons, as a single
evolutionary dead-end would have cataclysmic effects. As the scope of
the commons problem increases, the consequences of inaction or faulty
action increase as well.
Traditional regulatory solutions, that require a centralized arbiter
who can allocate the resource optimally, are also insufficient.
Regulatory frameworks for localized common problems are usually tied to
sovereign nations. Globalized commons problems, on the other hand, are
large enough that they fall outside the scope of traditional, unilateral
government regulation. Unlike most localized common resource problems, a
single government cannot regulate a solution here. Even if the United
States severely restricted the supply of antibiotics tomorrow,
developing countries like India and China could still use continue their
overuse. And when resistance develops anywhere, the interconnectedness
of today’s society allows the mutation to spread rapidly.
The scope of the globalized commons dwarfs the regulatory scope of
any single nation and thus requires extensive cooperation between
multiple nations. Such problems require novel organizational structures
that operate on the supranational level. Indeed, these challenges may
serve as a critical impetus for breaking through to the next level of
cooperation.
[1] E. Ostrom, “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,” Science 284, no. 5412 (1999): 278-279, doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278.
[2] “What is an Antibiotic?” What is an Antibiotic? Accessed February 17, 2017. http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/m….
mattschrage - May 7, 2017 @ 12:54 am
· Filed under Evolving Morality
In economics, things take longer to happen than you think
they will, and then they happen faster than you thought they could. —
Rüdiger “Rudi” Dornbusch
Technology fundamentally changes the relationship between labor and
capital. As machines get better producing the things that people need
and want, humans may find it difficult to generate economic value from
their work. In a future where this connection has been entirely severed,
capitalism and economic self-interest cease to provide structure for
society. New organizing principles are needed. Utilitarianism is well
suited to fill this vacuum and Marxist thought offers a pragmatic
framework for implementing utilitarian impulses in the political and
economic domain.
In his seminal work, The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx
popularized the notion of the proletariat as an impoverished class of
industrial wage-laborers. By his definition, the class of people that
compose the substrate of the proletariat has not existed in developed
countries since the early 1900s. Furthermore, the potential for a
worker’s revolution seems to be rendered inert if we posit that the end
of labor itself is near.
However, the etymology of the word, rather than its Marxist usage,
suggests something different. The origins of the word ‘proletariat’ can
be traced back to the Latin, proles, a word used in the Roman
census to describe the lowest class: those whose only contribution to
society was having children. In a future where human labor has been
entirely divorced from economic productivity, most individuals in
society would have no utility beyond passing their genes on to the next
generation. Severing the link between economic productivity and human
labor threatens to create an idle class, a new proletariat, who are
incapable of providing economic value to society. This post-work proletariat will not be defined by wage-labor, but by an idleness brought about through labor market inadequacies.
Will this idle class be destitute and penniless: abandoned by a
system of resource allocation that made their labor an anachronism? It
is not difficult to imagine, in a society such as this, an elite class,
that controls the means of production, consolidating an unprecedented
degree of power and wealth. This Luddite vision of the future conceives
of automation as a profoundly destructive force, one that could
transform inclusive democracy into a bourgeois oligarchy.
However, to others, automation is a panacea. These proponents of
technological innovation envision a type of fully-automated “luxury
communism” — the means of production owned collectively and operating
autonomously — where every material desire can be made real (for free!)
by an intelligent robot. For these people, the end of labor is not a
harbinger of collapse, but rather a freedom so elusive that humanity had
myopically believed it impossible. Should we dare to hope for such an
outcome? What should be our aspirations for a society without work and what principles should guide us?
Outcomes are important. This is the lesson taught by utilitarian
thinkers. Actions, individuals and societies should be judged upon their
consequences, their outputs. Society should aspire to produce the best
outcomes for the greatest number of its citizens. When viewed through
this lens, success is merely a maximization problem. How should society
allocate finite resources in a manner that maximizes the quality of life
of individuals living in it?
Marx provides a utilitarian theory of allocation: communal ownership.
Rather than following the capitalist model, in which certain
individuals are entitled to the immense wealth spun off from their
private enterprises, Marx contends that the profits of industry should
be distributed “to each according to his need.” In The Utilitarianism of Marx and Engels, Derek Allen discusses the utilitarian underpinning to Marxist teleology:
Marx contends that, since wages and profits vary
inversely, “the interests of capital and the interests of wage labour
are diametrically opposed.” Whatever enriches the capitalist
impoverishes the worker. … Whatever is in bourgeois interests is against
the interests of the majority of society. To secure freedom for the
majority wage labor must be abolished
The nature of the accumulation of capital results in an expanding
underclass of laborers and a shrinking bourgeois minority. The end point
of capitalism, as Marx understood it, is extreme wealth inequality.
When a vast majority create no economic value and are therefore
incapable of providing for themselves, the system is broken.
Utilitarianism does not privilege the rights of the minority at the
expense of the majority. Thus, the utilitarian response to this
inequality is to strive for a more equitable distribution of wealth.
However, there is no use in pining for a utopian society that only
can exist in theory. Progress is path dependent. Humanity’s future is a
function of today’s conditions. Rather imagining the elements of an
ideal society, pragmatism suggests looking for sources to guide the
development of an attainable one. The work of Karl Marx not only
provides a theoretical optimum — communal ownership of the means of
production — but also a realistic pathway to its realization. While his
original theory of an industrial working class rising up against its
capitalist oppressors has proven false, an updated teleology predicated
on the end of labor regains intellectual vitality.
Automation and Society After Labor
Automation ultimately renders human labor obsolete and magnifies the
return on capital. While vast swaths of workers face declining wages, a
small class of capitalists capture the growing profits that previously
were spread more broadly. The end of labor centralizes wealth, while
simultaneously seeing the emergence of an idle proletariat.
The age of automation became inevitable the day the first computer
was created. The steady march of innovation has reduced the typical
computer’s physical size, lowered its price, and simultaneously
increased its computing power. For decades, this ongoing technological
innovation complemented, rather than replaced, human labor. Computers
could not perform the physical tasks done easily by humans. Basic
intuitions about cause and effect were out of the reach of machines. In
the words of Steven Pinker “hard problems [were] easy and the easy
problems [were] hard.” This paradox seemed to be an inviolable law of
artificial intelligence. However, in recent years skills that were once
considered deep within the domain of human expertise, such as vision and
the language processing, have been replicated by deep learning
programs.
“The Great Decoupling” that Andre McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson describe in The Second Machine Age
is the manifestation of the shift from technology that enhances human
labor to that which supplants. While economic productivity continues to
increase, wages stagnate. The wealth generated by artificial labor is
captured by a tiny fraction of society, those who control capital,
rather than the broad middle class that used to work for wages.
The dynamics that Marx witnessed during the industrial revolution now
play out again with greater intensity. Marx, while wrong in many ways,
was prescient in others. In Wage-Labor & Capital, he
outlines the cyclical force of competition, the tension between the
wage-laborer and the capitalist, and the teleology of capitalism. He
describes the dynamics of automation: “Machinery produces the same
effects [as competition between workers], but upon a much larger scale. …
[W]here newly introduced, it throws workers upon the streets in great
masses.” Automation is the process by which capital is substituted for
labor. Automated machinery replaces human labor at a fraction of the
cost, often with greater accuracy and speed. Human workers simply cannot
compete. In discussing how machines reduce the wages of workers, Marx
also explains how automation expands the size of the new proletariat:
In addition, the working class is also recruited from the
higher strata of society; a mass of small business men and of people
living upon the interest of their capitals is precipitated into the
ranks of the working class, and they will have nothing else to do than
to stretch out their arms alongside of the arms of the workers. Thus the
forest of outstretched arms, begging for work, grows ever thicker,
while the arms themselves grow every leaner.
Automation devalues labor and multiplies capital. Economies of scale
and winner-take-all effects sharply bifurcate society. The winners, who
control the automated machinery, win big. Yet the losers, far greater in
number, are left with virtually nothing. This includes the middle and
upper-middle class that succeeded in a society where labor retained its
value. The lawyers, the doctors, the civil engineers that composed the
professional class will also join “the forest of outstretched arms,
begging for work” as their jobs are automated.
Eventually society reaches an inflection point. Without new rules,
the end result is dystopia. With new rules, utopia is possible. The
outcome depends on whether society adopts inclusive, redistributionist
policies or chooses to continue traditional practices of laissez faire
capitalism. If the political economy can adjust to the realities of
automation by providing for the idle class, the future will tend towards
“luxury communism” rather than Luddite dystopia. However, if no changes
take place, the gap between the richest and the poorest will continue
to grow.
Marx would predict that the new proletariat, by nature of its
majority, should be able to enact socialist and redistributionist
policies. Though he foresaw the need for violent revolution, it is
possible that an inclusive democracy might make such extremism
unnecessary. If these changes are enacted, society might look radically
different than it does today, but the outcomes would be broadly
beneficial. The immense wealth generated by automation could be shared
with the workers whose labor has been replaced. The means of production
do not need to be seized, but the profits generated would redistributed to those made idle.
From this perspective, the post-labor society should be judged by how
effectively it implements utilitarian principles. To be sure, such
redistribution infringes on deontological property rights and would be
judged harshly by libertarians. However, a utilitarian would see that,
while a minority is dissatisfied when their wealth is taxed, the
benefits to society overall outweigh their concern.
Criticisms of Teleology & Marxism
Of course it is necessary to defend any teleology against events that
change fundamental assumptions. Teleology is merely an extrapolation
from present trends that seems to lead inexorably to a singular outcome.
Marx’s original teleology suggested that industrial manufacturing would
be the final iteration of the capitalist system — he did not foresee
the shift among western nations to a service-oriented economy or the
massive wealth that would be unlocked by the Internet revolution. In
presenting a similar, albeit updated, teleology, it’s important to
outline the most important assumption that are necessary for its
realization: human labor must become, for all intents and purposes,
obsolete. If there were still ways for a critical mass of individuals to
engage in economically productive behavior, transitioning from
capitalism would remain difficult.
It’s also important to address the criticisms of Marxism more
generally. Marx’s revolutionary teleology has proven incorrect in many
ways. The industrial collapse envisioned by Marx failed to occur. His
imagined legions of revolutionary workers never materialized. His
ideology of revolution coopted by professional revolutionaries, rather
than the workers who it was meant for. Criticisms of Marxist thought
tend to fixate on its inability to forecast the broad prosperity that
would spring from capitalism.
This is a misunderstanding of Marx’s argument. The proletarian revolt
is but a revolution deferred. Marx believed that the worker uprising
would come at the peak of capitalism, as the system imploded — not that worker’s could never benefit under a capitalist system. Indeed, in Wage-Labor & Capital,
he writes that “the rapid growth of capital is the most favorable
condition for wage-labour” as the growth of capital implies increasing
employment, other externalities of capitalism notwithstanding. By
replacing labor entirely with capital, automation will bring about both
the peak and the end of capitalism. This is the critical moment when the
capitalist system could evolve or be replaced. Whether this development
takes the form of abrupt revolution or incremental change depends on
how the transition is managed.
Beyond Marx’s failure as a prognosticator, further criticisms of
Marxism attack the expropriation and redistribution that is inherent in
the theory. This is the libertarian critique. Property rights are at the
core of libertarianism. To philosophers like John Locke and Robert
Nozick, the defense of such rights is the sole legitimate purpose of
government action. A strong defense of property seems to preclude
redistribution. Yet a reexamination of Locke’s Labor Theory of Property,
under the assumption that human labor is economically irrelevant, shows
that Locke’s and Marx’s views are quite compatible. The Labor Theory of
Property, which provides the intellectual underpinning for the
libertarian conception of property rights, states that property is
derived through mixing personal labor with a natural resource:
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.
Without labor, the libertarian understanding of property breaks down.
In a future where robot automatons can produce any good, who owns
their output? If no labor input was required, by what principle should
the capitalist be the sole beneficiary? There is no obvious
justification for property rights. Indeed, An elite bourgeois minority
that captures all the economic output without mixing in their (or any)
labor is an easy target for redistributionist efforts. Separating human
labor from economic productivity debases the Lockean justification for
property rights. In this context, the abolition of property rights is
hard to criticize when the institution of private property itself has
been rendered obsolete.
This paper is not intended as a broad defense of Marxism as it could
exist in the world today, but rather an exploration of whether Marxist
principles have anything to say about organizing society after
the end of labor. Automation, by substituting human labor for capital,
accelerates the centralized accumulation of wealth. Those who control
capital stand to benefit disproportionately, while workers who are
replaced lose their income. The structure of society must change if it
is to withstand the economic shock of the end of labor. Marxist thought
is relevant as it suggests a vision for society, undergirded by sound
utilitarian logic, which would be capable of doing so.
While “luxury communism” seems somewhat fantastical, I am hopefully
optimistic that, in the short term, redistributionist policies such as a
negative income tax or a universal basic income will ease the
transition from a labor to a post-labor economy. A socialist society,
where the economic benefits of automation are distributed more broadly,
will be better equipped to manage and mitigate wealth inequality than a
capitalist society that refuses to address the problem.
Bibliography
Allen, Derek P. H. “The Utilitarianism of Marx and Engels.” American Philosophical Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1973): 189-99. http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20009494.
Merchant, Brian. “Fully automated luxury communism.” The Guardian, March 18th, 2015.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Andrew McAfee. The second machine age: work, progress, and prosperity in the time of brilliant technologies. New York: W. W. Norton, 2016.
Marx, Karl. 1978. Wage labour and capital. Foreign Languange Press Peking.
Locke, John, 1632-1704. The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. Oxford :B. Blackwell, 1948.
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